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157 
Not All “Units” Are Created Equal: How Hebble v. Shell 
Western E & P, Inc. Missed an Opportunity to Curb the 
Expansion of Fiduciary Obligations in Oklahoma Oil and 
Gas Law 
I. Introduction 
In Hebble v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., the Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals further expanded a line of cases that has imposed increasingly 
onerous fiduciary obligations upon oil and gas operators in Oklahoma.1  
Prior to Hebble, a fiduciary obligation was imposed on an operator only 
after the state modified rights of interested parties.2  For example, such a 
modification occurs in a forced pooling action when the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission (Commission) forces a landowner to transfer his 
mineral interest to an operator or else participate in the proposed drilling.3  
The plaintiffs in Hebble sought compensation for underpaid royalties 
from wells drilled in the 1970s and argued for relief based both in tort and 
contract.4  One of the wells implicated in this case, the Brittain Deep No. 2 
Sycamore well, was drilled subject to a voluntary joint operating 
agreement.5  The joint operating agreement did not implicate the police 
powers of the state because the Commission did not need to issue an order 
compelling the cooperative development of the unit.6  With little 
explanation or discussion, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals identified 
the drilling and spacing order as the state’s modification of the plaintiffs’ 
rights, despite the fact that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had declined to do 
so only five years earlier.7 
Many oil and gas terms and statutes are interrelated in both function and 
purpose, leading to many instances in which distinct legal terms such as 
“drilling and spacing units,” “forced pooling,” and “unitization” are 
improperly used.8  Even within one state, the distinctions between different 
types of oil and gas “units” can be subtle yet important.  In Hebble, for 
example, the court ignored important distinctions and significantly 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See generally 238 P.3d 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010). 
 2. See Howell v. Texaco, Inc., 112 P.3d 1154, 1160 (Okla. 2004). 
 3. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a) (2000). 
 4. See Hebble, 238 P.3d at 941. 
 5. See id. at 943. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id.; see also Howell, 112 P.3d at 1160-61. 
 8. See, e.g., Ward v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 501 P.2d 503 (Okla. 1972) (addressing the 
common confusion between drilling and spacing units and forced pooling). 
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expanded the circumstances in which an oil and gas operator can be 
burdened with fiduciary duties.  The court inappropriately equated a 
Commission drilling and spacing order to a Commission unitization order.9 
The units resulting from these orders differ substantially in both form and 
purpose.  A Commission order that unitizes a field for secondary recovery 
operations substantially alters the rights among the interested parties, 
whereas a drilling and spacing order merely sets out which parties have the 
rights to production within the unit.10  The Hebble opinion provides little 
insight into which characteristics of a drilling and spacing order the court 
felt were similar enough to a unitization order to warrant the imposition of 
fiduciary obligations on the operator.11 
In Hebble, the operator (Shell) was held liable for $53,625,000 in 
punitive damages based on its underpayment of roughly $750,000 in 
royalties owed on two wells drilled in the 1970s.12  A punitive award of this 
magnitude has serious implications for the oil and gas industry in 
Oklahoma.  An operator’s potential liability resulting from this decision is 
incongruent with the simple nature and purpose of the drilling and spacing 
unit. 
This note will attempt to present the Hebble opinion in a simple and 
understandable manner, point out the deficiencies in its reasoning, and 
explain how its holding can impact the oil and gas industry going forward.  
Part II explains the background and purpose of the Commission’s 
regulation of the oil and gas industry and how the Commission uses its 
powers to further that purpose.  Part II examines the cases prior to Hebble 
that discuss which actions by the Commission warrant an imposition of 
fiduciary duties upon oil and gas operators.  Part III provides a summary of 
the facts in Hebble, as well as an account of the court’s limited reasoning 
and analysis.  Part IV points out the deficiencies in Hebble’s reasoning and 
details the implications for oil and gas operators in Oklahoma moving 
forward.  Part V briefly concludes. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Hebble, 238 P.3d at 943. 
 10. See generally 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 287.1-287.15, 87.1(a) (2000). 
 11. See Hebble, 238 P.3d at 943. 
 12. See id. at 942. 
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II. Pre-Hebble Oklahoma Law Regarding the Relationship Between an 
Operator and Interested Parties to an Oil and Gas Lease 
A. The Statutory Power of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission 
Beginning in the late-nineteenth century, courts throughout the country 
began to adopt and apply the rule of capture to oil and gas extraction by 
analogizing the movement of subsurface hydrocarbons to the movement of 
water and wild animals.13  The rule of capture states:  “[t]he owner of a tract 
of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled 
thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from 
adjoining lands.”14  According to the rule of capture, an adjoining 
landowner’s only remedy is to drill his own well to “offset” the drainage by 
his neighbor.15  
If left unregulated, the offset drilling remedy has many negative 
consequences.  If too many offset wells are drilled, economic waste occurs 
because far more wells are drilled than are necessary to drain the oil and gas 
from the reservoir efficiently.16  Over-drilling can also damage the natural 
reservoir energy necessary to extract the oil and gas and result in irreparable 
damage to the recoverability of valuable hydrocarbons.17  Once the natural 
reservoir energy has dissipated, extraction of the oil or gas often becomes 
economically unfeasible.18 In addition, excess drilling equipment and 
surface locations required to drill unnecessary offset wells result in 
additional environmental impacts.19 Lastly, the high production rate causes 
supply to smother demand, resulting in price depression and environmental 
problems associated with storing the excess supply.20 
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission has been granted 
administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers allowing it to regulate 
Oklahoma’s oil and gas industry and counteract the negative effects of the 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Westmoreland Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889). 
 14. Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas 
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 900 (2005) (quoting Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of 
Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935)). 
 15. See id. at 909-10. 
 16. See Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004 
Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 277, 278 (2004). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. 
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rule of capture.21  The Commission’s goals are two-fold:  (1) to prevent 
surface, underground, and economic waste and (2) to protect the correlative 
rights of mineral owners so that each owner gets a fair and equitable share 
of the minerals beneath his tract.22  The protection of “correlative rights” 
first began as a judicial effort designed to prevent operators from taking an 
undue proportion of oil or gas from a common source of supply by allowing 
all landowners the opportunity to obtain a fair and equitable share of the oil 
or gas.  The protection of correlative rights is now made explicit by 
Oklahoma’s conservation statute.23  The Commission wields a variety of 
tools to enhance its efforts to prevent waste and protect correlative rights, 
including the establishment of drilling and spacing units, forced pooling, 
and unitization.24 
1. Drilling and Spacing Units 
The most important tool the Commission uses to protect against waste is 
the creation of drilling and spacing units.25  The Commission can control 
how many wells are drilled in each reservoir by establishing drilling and 
spacing units, thereby preventing underground, economic, and surface 
waste and protecting the correlative rights of neighboring landowners.26  
The Commission reviews and interprets geological evidence to determine 
the proper size and shape of the unit, which should be uniform with other 
units in a common reservoir absent special geological justifications.27  
Oklahoma’s current statute allows only one well to be drilled per spacing 
unit unless another well is reasonably necessary to drain a common source 
of supply efficiently.28 
In addition to establishing the density and location of drilling, 
Oklahoma’s statute apportions production to each owner within the unit on 
a net acreage basis regardless of the location of the well within the unit.29  
In other words, the drilling and spacing order pools the royalty interests—
                                                                                                                 
 21. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 873 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Okla. 1994). 
 22. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a) (2000). 
 23. See Kingwood Oil Co. v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 396 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Okla. 1964). 
 24. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1; see also 52 OKLA. STAT. § 287.1. 
 25. Joseph R. Dancy & Victoria A. Dancy, Regulation of the Oil and Gas Industry by 
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 21 TULSA L.J. 613, 627 (1986); see also 52 OKLA. 
STAT. § 87.1(a). 
 26. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(a). 
 27. See id. § 87.1(c). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. § 87.1(a). 
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those interests entitled to a proportion of the production—as if production is 
directly and proportionately attributable to each net acre within the unit.30 
2. Forced Pooling 
Oklahoma’s forced pooling statute works in conjunction with the drilling 
and spacing order to prevent waste and protect correlative rights.  When a 
drilling and spacing unit includes multiple undivided mineral interests or 
separately owned tracts, an agreement must be reached in order to pool 
lands for mutual development of the unit or else an account must be made 
to the non-consenting parties for their share of the profits.31  Under 
Oklahoma’s forced pooling statute, any party with a present right to drill 
can apply to force pool any interests that refuse to cooperate in the 
development of a valid drilling and spacing unit.32  Although the forced 
pooling order alters the private property rights of the parties involved, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held Oklahoma’s forced pooling statute to be 
a valid exercise of the state’s police power.33 
The forced pooling statute encourages development of the state’s natural 
resources by fairly apportioning risk.  Without a forced pooling statute, a 
co-tenant who refused to participate in a well would still be entitled to his 
proportionate share of the proceeds minus his share of the reasonable and 
necessary costs.34  If the operations failed and the operator lost the well, the 
co-tenant bore none of the risk of drilling and therefore would not be 
responsible for any of the costs of the failed well.  To promote 
development, the forced pooling order requires the working interest owners 
to either participate in the well and pay their proportionate share of the well 
costs or transfer their interest to the participating parties on trade terms 
determined by the market value of similar transactions in the immediate 
vicinity.35  At least two alternatives are offered to the non-participating 
party and the transfer can take various forms, such as a sale, lease, or farm-
out agreement.36 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See Fleet v. Sanguine, Ltd., 854 P.2d 892, n.12 (Okla. 1993). 
 31. See Meeker v. Denver Producing & Ref. Co., 188 P.2d 854, 856 (Okla. 1947). 
 32. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e). 
 33. See Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1951). 
 34. See Meeker, 188 P.2d at 856. 
 35. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 87.1(e). 
 36. A farmout agreement is defined as: 
a contract to assign rights in acreage upon the completion of a drilling obligation and the 
performance of the other provisions contained in the contract. Such an agreement allows a 
lessee who does not wish to drill to assign all or part of the lease to another operator who 
does wish to drill. 
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In contrast to the forced pooling order, unitization usually encompasses 
an entire reservoir.37  Drilling operations will eventually deplete the natural 
energy of a reservoir even if it is properly conserved.38  Secondary or 
enhanced recovery operations are designed to maintain or artificially 
enhance depleted reservoir energy. To facilitate secondary recovery 
operations and protect correlative rights, a unitized reservoir is operated as 
a single unit by a single, Commission-appointed unit operator.39  
Unitization is often appropriate for mature, significantly depleted fields that 
require some type of extraordinary measures, such as waterflooding, to 
extract minerals from the subsurface after primary recovery techniques 
have been exhausted.40  Since these techniques require operations 
throughout the entire reservoir, unitization is necessary to combine all of 
the property interests that overlay the reservoir.41 
Similar to the forced pooling order, the unitization order sets forth the 
manner in which costs are to be allocated and appoints a single unit 
operator.42  A unitization order differs from forced pooling and drilling and 
spacing units in that the unitization order takes into account prior 
production history and allocates production and costs based on those areas 
that have proven to be productive within the unit area.43  Acreage 
geologically proven to be non-productive would not share in the production 
from a unitization order, unlike a drilling and spacing unit, in which all 
acreage shares equally based on the size of the interest instead of the 
productivity.44 
Although secondary recovery techniques are often appropriate for many 
reservoirs, achieving unitization through voluntary agreement is generally 
difficult due to the transaction costs of securing multi-party agreements.  
Compulsory unitization partially addresses this problem, but Oklahoma law 
requires substantial voluntary agreement before the Commission may force 
                                                                                                                 
58 C.J.S. MINES AND MINERALS § 385 (2010); see also Dancy & Dancy, supra note 25, at 
643-44. 
 37. See Anderson & Smith, supra note 16, at 284.  
 38. See id. 
 39. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 287.4. 
 40. See Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 
1168 (1952). 
 41. See id. 
 42. See 52 OKLA. STAT. § 287.4. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
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holdouts to unitize.45  Many times, the required percentage of voluntary 
agreement will not be reached even though the area is a prime candidate for 
unitization operations.  
4. Private Joint Operating Agreements 
Joint operating agreements are private, voluntary agreements among 
interested parties for the operation of a tract or leasehold for oil, gas, and 
other minerals.46  The parties to a joint operating agreement typically agree 
to appoint one party as operator of the premises for the joint benefit of all 
parties, and the parties share in the expenses and proceeds.47  Since no state 
action is involved, general contract principles require that the parties’ 
relationship be governed by the express terms of the agreement.48  In 
Oklahoma, no fiduciary duty arises from the parties entering into a joint 
operating agreement.49  A fiduciary duty can arise from a voluntary 
agreement if specific facts suggest a special relationship of trust was 
contracted for among the parties.50 
B. An Oil and Gas Operator’s Fiduciary Obligations Prior to Hebble 
Oklahoma's rule defining the relationship between a lessor and lessee of 
an oil and gas lease was stated in Bunger v. Rogers in 1941.51  In that case, 
the lessor sued the lessee for underpayment of royalty.52  According to the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court: 
The defendants were merely lessees under an oil and gas mining 
lease and were under no obligation to the plaintiff, other than to 
pay the rent and royalty provided in said lease, and if they 
breached this duty then their liability was purely a contractual 
one and in no sense fiduciary.53  
                                                                                                                 
 45. See id.  See generally Anderson & Smith, supra note 16, at 284-86. 
 46. 3 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 29:6 (3d ed. 2010). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See, e.g., Pitco Prod. Co. v. Chaparral Energy Inc., 63 P.3d 541 (Okla. 2003). 
 49. See Tarrant v. Capstone Oil & Gas Co., 178 P.3d 866, 870-71 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2008). 
 50. See David E. Pierce, Transactional Evolution of Operating Agreements in the Oil 
and Gas Industry (Mar. 2008) (presentation before the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation). 
 51. See 112 P.2d 361, 362 (Okla. 1941). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 363. 
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A lessor and lessee are merely contracting parties, and thus no fiduciary 
relationship arises. 
In contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded in Young v. West 
Edmond Hunton Lime Unit that in a unitization, an appointed unit operator 
may owe fiduciary duties to other unitized parties.54  In Young, the plaintiffs 
(lessors) leased their mineral rights to various oil companies (lessees).55  A 
productive formation was subsequently found on the lessors’ lands and the 
Commission, pursuant to its statutory authority, ordered this field to be 
produced as a single unit by an appointed unit operator.56  This order 
allocated production to the interested parties based on the potential 
productivity of each tract in the unit and deprived the lessees of the right to 
produce oil or gas from the lessors’ lands.57  The mineral rights owners 
were compelled to give up their right to produce from their lands in 
exchange for a portion of the production from the larger unitized area.58  
The court analogized the position of the appointed operator of the unit to 
that of a trustee, because the royalty owners had no say in the management 
of the unit or in the selection of the unit operator.59  On a subsequent 
appeal, the court further stated that “the Unit, under the circumstances of its 
fiduciary relationship as revealed by the record, must account to the royalty 
owners, as to its handling of their affairs.”60 
In Olansen v. Texaco Inc. the Oklahoma Supreme Court further 
emphasized what effect a state modification of rights had on the 
relationship between an operator and interest owner.61  In 1961, the 
Commission created the East Glenn Unit pursuant to Oklahoma’s 
unitization statute and named Texaco as the operator.62  The unit was 
comprised of only one lease, in which the appellees owned an interest in 
forty of the 160 acres (25%).63  Texaco neglected to check the county 
records in order to identify the interest held by the appellees and failed to 
pay the appellees their share of production.64  Under the terms of the lease 
to Texaco, appellees were not entitled to share in the production unless a 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See generally 275 P.2d 304 (Okla. 1954). 
 55. Id. at 306. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. at 308. 
 59. See id. at 309. 
 60. W. Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Young, 325 P.2d 1047, 1052 (Okla. 1958). 
 61. See generally 587 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1978). 
 62. Id. at 978. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 979. 
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well was drilled directly on their forty-acre tract.65  The unitization order, 
however, entitled the appellees to proportionally share in production from 
the entire unit despite such limitation.66  The court noted that the 
Commission unitization order modified the rights between the parties and 
relied on this fact as the basis for its conclusion that Texaco owed the 
appellees a fiduciary duty.67  The court rejected Texaco’s reliance on 
Bunger, stating:  “The pivotal issue here is not the relationship between a 
unit operator and a mineral owner but the critical concern involves the legal 
effect of resort to police powers of the state on the part of the lessee 
(Texaco) which modified and amended existing legal rights . . . .”68 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court again distinguished the lease relationship 
from the unitization relationship in Leck v. Continental Oil Co.69  On a 
federally certified question from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court reiterated that the lease agreement creates no 
fiduciary duty.70  The court stated, “This duty is not created by the lease 
agreement but rather by the unitization order and agreement.”71 
Most recently, in Howell v. Texaco Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
addressed whether a drilling and spacing unit alone created a fiduciary 
relationship.72  The plaintiffs in Howell had entered into lease contracts and 
communitization agreements with Texaco, or in some instances with 
Texaco’s predecessor, and sued Texaco for improper payment of 
royalties.73  Although the Commission had unitized some of the plaintiffs’ 
land, much of the land remained subject to the sole authority of the 
voluntary development agreements reached between the plaintiffs and 
Texaco.74  Echoing previous holdings, the court stated, “The 
communitization agreements, unlike unitization orders, are contracts just as 
the leases are contracts . . . . the communitization agreements do not create 
a fiduciary duty on Texaco’s part.”75  
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 981. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. at 985. 
 69. See generally 800 P.2d 224 (Okla. 1989). 
 70. See id. at 229. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See generally 112 P.3d 1154 (Okla. 2004). 
 73. Id. at 1157. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1160. 
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The Howell plaintiffs explicitly petitioned the court to analogize the 
drilling and spacing unit to a unitization order in their briefs to the court.76  
Since part of the plaintiffs’ lands had not been unitized by the Commission, 
the plaintiffs had to convince the court that a drilling and spacing unit 
(operated pursuant to a lease or communitization agreement) should impose 
the same fiduciary obligations on operators as unitization orders.77  The 
court failed to see the merit in the plaintiffs’ argument, stating: 
The plaintiffs have misconstrued [the] cases.  This court has not 
held that a royalty lease alone creates a fiduciary relationship.  
To the extent that other courts have so held when applying 
Oklahoma law, they have misread our decisions.  Texaco had no 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs based on the leases or the 
communitization agreement.78 
Up until Hebble v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., the creation of a drilling 
and spacing unit was not a valid basis for imposing a fiduciary duty on an 
operator.79 
III. Hebble v. Shell Western E & P, Inc.:  The Oklahoma Court of Civil 
Appeals Imposes a Fiduciary Duty on an Operator Pursuant to a Drilling 
and Spacing Order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Shell desired to conduct secondary recovery operations on a lease 
(Crews Lease) in which the appellees (Owners) had reserved an interest in 
the net-profits from oil and gas operations.80  Shell obtained unitization 
orders from the Commission and was appointed as the unit operator for the 
Brittain Sims Unit in 1964 and the Brittain Deese Unit in 1970.81  Shell 
subsequently petitioned the Commission for a drilling and spacing unit for 
the Sycamore formation in 1972 and was granted an eighty-acre drilling 
and spacing unit.82  Pursuant to a voluntary joint operating agreement, Shell 
was appointed the operator of the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore well.83  
                                                                                                                 
 76. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for Defendants-Appellants at 5, Hebble v. Shell W. 
E&P, Inc., 238 P.3d 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (No. 106,470). 
 77. See Howell, 112 P.3d at 1160. 
 78. Id. at 1161. 
 79. 238 P.3d 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) cert. denied. 
 80. Id. at 941-42; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Hebble, 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010), cert. denied. 
 81. Hebble, 238 P.3d at 941-42. 
 82. Id. at 942. 
 83. Id. 
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Shell eventually sold its interest in the Crews Lease to Maynard Oil 
Company (Maynard) in 1985.84 
The Crews Lease—and therefore the Owners’ net-profits interest—was 
included in the Brittain Sims Unit, Brittain Deese Unit, and Brittain Deep 
No. 2 Sycamore well.85  However, Shell failed to pay the Owners $715,090 
from the net-profits of the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore well and $35,617 
from the net-profits of the Brittain Deese Unit.86  Owners brought suit 
against Shell and Maynard in 1995 based on tort theories as the five-year 
statute of limitations for contract had expired.87  Maynard settled with the 
Owners, while Shell decided to litigate.88  Shell made multiple motions for 
summary judgment based on its statute of limitations argument but the trial 
court ruled that Shell owed the Owners a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty 
arising from the Commission’s "unitization" orders.89  The matter 
proceeded to a jury trial in 2008 and the Owners were awarded $13,205,916 
in actual damages on grounds of:  (1) false representation, nondisclosure or 
concealment, deceit, or constructive fraud, and (2) breach of fiduciary 
duty.90  The Owners were also awarded $53,625,000 in punitive damages.91 
B. The Opinion of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals 
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s decision.92  Its opinion began with an examination of precedent 
regarding an operator’s duty as fiduciary.93  The court reasoned that 
because the unitization relationship is not voluntarily assumed by the 
parties, but instead is mandated by the state, the exercise of the police 
power of the state creates a trustee-like relationship between the operator 
and those parties interested in production from the unit.94  The court of civil 
appeals then equated a unitization order under title, 52, section 287.1 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes, with a drilling and spacing order under title 52, section 
87.1.95 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id.  
 85. See id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 947. 
 93. See id. at 943. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
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Relying on existing precedent from Howell and Leck, the court 
characterized Shell’s relationship to the Owners in the Brittain Deese Unit 
as fiduciary in nature since it arose from a Commission “unitization” 
order.96  Because a private joint operating agreement was reached among 
the working interest partners, the court admitted that the Brittain Deep No. 
2 Sycamore unit was “less clear-cut,” but reasoned that since the Owners 
were not parties to the joint operating agreement, it had no bearing on the 
relationship between Shell and the Owners.97  The court concluded that 
since the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore was not drilled on the Crews Lease, 
Shell’s duty to pay the Owners from the net-profits of the well arose from 
the drilling and spacing order of the Commission and therefore the police 
powers of the state.98  The court affirmed the actual and punitive damages 
flowing from the fiduciary duty created by the Commission’s exercise of 
state police power.99 
IV.  Hebble Misunderstands the Nature of the Drilling and Spacing Unit, 
Misconstrues the Case Law, and Misguides the Future of Oklahoma Oil 
and Gas Law 
A. The Reasons Justifying a Fiduciary Standard for Unitization Orders Do 
Not Justify a Fiduciary Standard for a Drilling and Spacing Order 
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals fails to explain its view that a 
drilling and spacing order is analogous to a unitization order.100  Although 
the court recites case law generally relevant to the fiduciary obligations of 
an operator, the court’s analysis of the particular facts in Hebble provides 
no distinct justification for its expansion of fiduciary obligations to drilling 
and spacing units.101  This expansion is justified neither by the nature of the 
drilling and spacing unit nor by Oklahoma's case law. 
Olansen requires that the state modify the existing legal rights of 
interested parties before a fiduciary duty can be imposed on the operator.102  
Obtaining a drilling and spacing order is one of the initial steps in drilling a 
well that merely helps define the rights among the parties.  The correlative 
rights doctrine gives royalty owners an opportunity to secure a fair share of 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Olansen v. Texaco, 587 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1978). 
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oil or gas from a common reservoir; the establishment of a drilling and 
spacing unit does not change this fundamental right.  In fact, the drilling 
and spacing order changes two things:  (1) production from the unit is 
divided proportionately among all royalty owners within the unit regardless 
of which part of the unit production actually occurs and (2) the location of 
the well is determined by the drilling and spacing order.  In Hebble, the 
plaintiffs owned a net-profits interest, which means the plaintiffs assigned 
their working interest (and accompanying right to drill) and reserved a right 
to a portion of the net proceeds from any subsequent oil or gas 
production.103  Because the plaintiffs owned neither a royalty interest nor 
the right to drill, the drilling and spacing unit had no direct effect on the 
plaintiffs’ net-profits interest.  Conceptually, the plaintiffs’ interest was 
nothing more than a contractual burden on a working interest owner to 
receive a portion of any net proceeds secured from oil and gas production. 
A drilling and spacing order does not appoint an operator of the unit.  In 
Hebble, Shell became the operator of the drilling and spacing unit by 
reaching a voluntary joint operating agreement with the other working 
interest owners.  Prior to the joint operating agreement, any working 
interest owner could have force pooled the unit and petitioned the 
Commission to be appointed unit operator.  Only after the joint operating 
agreement was signed did Shell have the exclusive right to drill.  Having 
leased their working interest, the net-profits interest owners had no say in 
the choice of the operator.  The plaintiffs or the plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-
interest had assigned that right away when they decided to lease their 
working interest rights.  Misunderstanding the mechanics of the net-profits 
transaction, the court reasoned, “[h]ad the [net-profits] Owners been parties 
to the JOA, we would not find a fiduciary duty.”104  The court failed to 
recognize that the net-profits owners voluntarily assigned their right to be a 
party to a joint operating agreement when they leased their working 
interest, thereby voluntarily relinquishing any voice in the selection of an 
operator and implicitly approving any selection made. 
Since the Brittain Deep No. 2 Sycamore well was drilled pursuant to a 
joint operating agreement, the police powers of the state were not 
implicated.  The Hebble court’s reliance on the drilling and spacing order as 
a state modification of existing legal rights of the parties contradicts the 
nature and purpose of the drilling and spacing unit.  There are key statutory 
distinctions between a drilling and spacing unit and a unitization order that 
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makes imposing fiduciary obligations appropriate in one instance and not 
the other.  Oklahoma’s unitization statute expressly anticipates that the 
unitization order will modify the rights of the parties involved, providing:  
“Property rights, leases, contracts, and all other rights and obligations shall 
be regarded as amended and modified to the extent necessary to conform to 
the provisions and requirements of this act . . . .”105  The statute authorizing 
the Commission to create drilling and spacing units contains no such 
provision, presumably because the statute was not intended to modify the 
rights of any parties involved.106 
The unitization act also requires that “[e]ach unit shall be authorized on 
behalf and for the account of all the owners of the oil and gas rights within 
the area, without profit to the unit, to supervise, manage and conduct further 
development and operations for the production of the oil and gas . . . .”107  
The need for the “without profit” language is derived from the method of 
production allocation in the unitization act: 
A separately owned tract’s fair, equitable and reasonable share 
of the unit production shall be measured by the value of each 
such tract for oil and gas purposes and its contributing value to 
the unit in relation to like values of other tracts in the unit, 
taking into account acreage, the quantity of oil and gas 
recoverable therefrom, location on structure, its probable 
productivity of oil and gas in the absence of unit operations, the 
burden of operation to which the tract will or is likely to be 
subjected, or so many of said factors, or such other pertinent 
engineering, geological, or operating factors, as may be 
reasonably susceptible of determination.108 
Absent the “without profit” language, an operator could theoretically 
operate the unit in such a way as to maximize production from the areas in 
which the operator has the greatest interest and amend the unitization order 
to re-allocate a greater percentage of production to the operator-owned 
tracts.109 
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The drilling and spacing statute contains no such “without profit” 
language.110  In contrast, an operator of an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma 
must make a profit from its operations to keep operating the lease.111  Also, 
all tracts within a drilling and spacing unit share proportionately in 
production, regardless of profitability.112  An operator gains no advantage 
by excluding production to those tracts within the drilling and spacing unit 
that are owned by the operator.  Of course, other conflicts of interests can 
arise between an operator and royalty owners in a drilling and spacing unit 
but prior to Hebble, Oklahoma chose to handle those conflicts with an 
increased standard of judicial scrutiny, not the imposition of a fiduciary 
duty.113  For instance, the Oklahoma Supreme Court developed a different 
method to calculate royalty payments when an operator sells production to 
an affiliated entity.114 
B. Hebble Misconstrues the Line of Cases Imposing Fiduciary Obligations 
on Operators and Unduly Expands Oklahoma’s Jurisprudence 
Hebble principally relies on Howell, Leck, and Olansen to expand 
fiduciary obligations to drilling and spacing units. These cases provide no 
support for the conclusion reached in Hebble.  In Howell, the court speaks 
expressly in terms of “unitization” when outlining the appropriate 
circumstances for the imposition of a fiduciary duty and refers to the term 
“unitization” with reference to Oklahoma’s Unitization Act, not the drilling 
and spacing unit.115 Hebble ignores this important distinction, stating, 
“After unitization, the leases no longer control,” and inappropriately cites to 
Howell for support.116  Howell’s interpretation of the unitization statute, 
while potentially useful to help interpret the drilling and spacing statute, 
does not provide direct support for the conclusion that a fiduciary duty 
accompanies a drilling and spacing unit.  As stated supra in the discussion 
of the Howell opinion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court implicitly rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that a drilling and spacing unit confers a fiduciary duty 
on an operator.117 
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Leck also fails to provide direct support for Hebble’s holding.  Hebble 
states, “The fiduciary duty of the unit operator arises not only from the 
creation of field-wide units for secondary recovery under Oklahoma’s 
Unitization Act, but also from the creation of drilling and spacing units 
under 52 O.S.Supp.2007 §87.1” and cites Leck as an example.118  The facts 
and language of Leck provide dubious support for this proposition.  Leck 
states, “[A fiduciary duty] is not a duty created by a lease agreement but 
rather by the unitization order and agreement . . . .  The only fiduciary duty 
owed the appellants was created by the unitization of Section 21.”119  The 
pure language of Leck appears to simply re-state and apply existing case 
law applying a fiduciary duty to a unitization order.   
Unfortunately, Leck adds confusion to the case law because the unit at 
issue in that case was actually a drilling and spacing unit, not a unitization 
order.120  The Hebble court seems to reconcile this inconsistency by 
assuming Leck meant to expand fiduciary duties to drilling and spacing 
units.  An equally valid assumption, however, is that Leck simply confused 
the proper meaning of “unitization.”  In fact, all the cases Leck relies on use 
the term “unitization” in its proper statutory sense, referring to an order 
issued pursuant to Oklahoma’s Unitization Act.121  Surely Leck did not 
intend to expand fiduciary duties to drilling and spacing units without any 
mention or discussion of the consequences of this significant shift in 
jurisprudence.  Regardless, the language in Leck should most properly be 
considered dicta since the true holding of Leck regarded the proper subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal district court.122 
Howell appears to provide strong support for the proposition that Leck 
simply confused “unitization” with a drilling and spacing unit.  Howell held 
that no fiduciary relationship existed despite the fact that drilling and 
spacing units had been created on portions of the plaintiffs’ lease and were 
at issue in that case.123  After discussing Oklahoma’s case law on the 
fiduciary duty of operators, including Leck, the Howell court concludes:  
“The plaintiffs [arguing for drilling and spacing units to trigger fiduciary 
duties] have misconstrued these cases . . . .  To the extent that other courts 
have so held when applying Oklahoma law, they have misread our 
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decisions.”124  Even assuming Leck actually meant to expand the case law 
as Hebble purports it does, Howell overrules this proposition. 
Furthermore, Leck is distinguishable from Hebble because the 
Commission force pooled the unit in Leck.125  Since the forced pooling 
order pools the cost-bearing interests and appoints an operator, some of the 
same elements that make a fiduciary duty appropriate for a unitization order 
are also present in a forced pooling order.126  The key requirement that the 
state modify the rights of the parties is arguably satisfied by the forced 
pooling order, unlike the drilling and spacing unit. 
Hebble goes on to state, “The critical factor is the resort to the police 
powers of the state on the part of a lessee in unitization proceedings which 
modify and amend existing legal rights” and cites Olansen for support.127  
Olansen’s fiduciary duty analysis refers specifically to Oklahoma’s 
unitization statute and how a specific unitization order modified the legal 
rights of the parties affected.128  Indeed, the Olansen opinion specifically 
notes that the unitization order is statutorily authorized to amend existing 
legal rights.129  Olansen’s analysis also does not provide direct support for 
the proposition that a drilling and spacing unit should be treated like a 
unitization order.  With regard to the fiduciary obligations of operators, the 
court in Hebble equates a drilling and spacing unit to a unitization order 
with no direct support for its proposition and no discussion of the 
justifications for its expansion of Oklahoma law. 
C. The Practical Realties of Operating an Oil and Gas Well Post-Hebble 
A state’s legal landscape affects the attractiveness of doing business 
within that state’s borders.  Chesapeake Energy’s recent experience in 
Roane County, West Virginia serves as a relevant and sobering example.  In 
2007, Chesapeake lost a judgment for $404 million, $270 million of which 
was punitive damages, for a case involving under-paid royalties.130  West 
Virginia was one of only two jurisdictions at the time that did not provide 
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an automatic appellate review procedure.131  The Roane County judge 
simply reviewed jury’s decision and upheld the entire jury award.132 
The effect on both Chesapeake and West Virginia was substantial.  Soon 
thereafter, Chesapeake announced that it was cancelling its plans to build a 
$40 million regional headquarters office in Charleston, West Virginia.133  
Aubrey McClendon, Chesapeake’s CEO, commented, “At the time, we 
realized that until West Virginia’s judicial system provides fair and 
unbiased access to its courts for everyone, a prudent company must be very 
cautious in committing further resources in the state.”134 
Likewise, Hebble puts Oklahoma at a competitive disadvantage with 
other states.  Although oil and gas producing states have large and 
complicated bodies of case law defining an operator’s appropriate standard 
of conduct in a variety of different factual scenarios, many states generally 
accept the proposition that the unique nature of a unitization order requires 
an enhanced standard of conduct by the operator.135  However, Hebble’s 
imposition of a fiduciary standard on an operator because of a drilling and 
spacing (or analogous) order is unprecedented.136  The vast majority of 
wells drilled in Oklahoma are drilled pursuant to a drilling and spacing 
order.  The Commission rarely unitizes lands because of the substantial 
voluntary agreement required and the large amount of land such a unit 
encompasses.137  Hebble imposes a fiduciary duty upon thousands of 
drilling and spacing unit operators, past and present.  
Presumably, an operator who took the care to bargain expressly for no 
fiduciary responsibility will lose the benefit of this bargain when the 
operator becomes operator of a drilling and spacing unit.  This is true even 
though the drilling and spacing statute contains no language authorizing the 
drilling and spacing order to amend the contracts between the parties.138  
Hebble re-writes the initial bargain and renders meaningless certain aspects 
of common oil and gas contracts such as leas, communitization agreements, 
nd JOAs.  
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What liabilities does a company inherit when it takes over the operation 
of a well from another party?  This was possibly the greatest unanswered 
question from Hebble. This question was left unanswered because 
Maynard, Shell’s successor-in-interest, settled with the plaintiffs in Hebble 
and was dismissed from the case.139  Successors-in-interest like Maynard 
could be acquiring decades of tort liability.  Oil and gas companies must 
already pay for a rigorous due diligence process when acquiring properties.  
Adding an investigation into each well’s fulfillment of its fiduciary 
obligations could be an untenable transactional cost.  This scenario could be 
the next step in this line of fiduciary jurisprudence.  Imposing higher 
transaction costs on one of Oklahoma’s most important industries deserves 
far more scrutiny than the limited discussion offered by Hebble’s analysis.  
Hopefully, the Oklahoma Supreme Court will soon address the “Maynard 
Question” and will reexamine Hebble’s dubious foundation. Rather than 
dealing with the unwanted effects of Hebble, the court should overrule this 
opinion and return Oklahoma to the stable line of pre-Hebble fiduciary 
jurisprudence.  
V. Conclusion 
The purpose and statutory definition of the unitization order is distinct 
from the drilling and spacing unit.  Such distinctions justify imposing a 
fiduciary burden on an operator only when a unitization order is involved.  
A drilling and spacing unit simply pools of the royalty interests. In contrast, 
a unitization order amends the legal rights of the parties involved by 
allocating all production and costs and appointing a unit operator.  
Oklahoma courts have consistently recognized the distinctions between a 
unitization order and a drilling and spacing unit and have imposed fiduciary 
obligations only where unitization orders have amended the legal rights of 
the parties involved.  Hebble expands an operator’s fiduciary obligation to 
drilling and spacing units without a statutory justification or precedent. The 
meager analysis in Hebble fails to communicate a logical basis for the 
expansion and creates a confusing legal landscape for past and future 
operators of drilling and spacing units currently attempting to negotiate oil 
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